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THE CONSTITUTION OF MALTA: SUPREMACY, PARLIAMENT AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
John Stanton* 
Abstract: The Constitution of Malta makes express provision for its own supremacy, 
clarifying the predominance of the codified document over the internal constitutional 
arrangements in the context of post-imperial government. This provision, though, 
presents legal and practical problems, particularly in view of the weak entrenchment 
the Constitution is afforded. This claim to supremacy is fragile and, in many respects, 
is dependent upon continued parliamentary recognition. What is more, in assessing 
the constitutional validity of legislation, the Constitutional Court has not regarded 
findings of invalidity as having effect beyond the scope of that particular case, 
leaving it to Parliament to determine whether constitutionally invalid laws should be 
repealed (or not). This article explores solutions to these problems, arguing for firmer 
constitutional entrenchment, a refined process for amendment and a more 
authoritative power for the Constitutional Court to declare unconstitutional Acts 
void.  
Keywords: Malta, constitutional supremacy, the Maltese Parliament, entrenchment, 
the Constitutional Court, constitutional review, the separation of powers. 
I. Introduction, context and history 
“The Constitution of Malta was given to the Maltese in 1964 by the United Kingdom 
Parliament”,1 upon the archipelago’s independence from the British Empire, coming into 
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1 Kevin Aquilina, The Rule of Law à la Maltaise: Selected writings of Kevin Aquilina (Msida: University of 
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force on 21 September of that year.2 Malta was by no means alone in inheriting an 
Independence Constitution negotiated with Britain at this time. A period of decolonisation in 
the two decades since the Second World War saw the dismantling of the British Empire, with 
most former colonies being declared independent by the late 1960s and many receiving 
similar constitutional documents.3 The 1964 Maltese Constitution, for instance, was, in some 
ways, modelled on that given to Nigeria in 1960 and Sierra Leone in 1961.4 
 British involvement in Malta began in 1800 following an invitation to assist in the 
successful defeat of Napoleon’s forces.5 Thereafter, the islands served as a British 
Protectorate until 1813 when, under the authority of the Bathurst Constitution and - a year 
later - the Treaty of Paris, formal legal recognition of Malta as a British colony became 
settled.6 In this context, it is hardly surprising that the Maltese constitutional settlement put in 
place in 1964 bears many similarities to the UK system, albeit in codified form and (since 
1974) within the framework of a Republic. As Aquilina explains, “[o]ur Constitution is … 
not home grown. It remains very much a colonial Constitution modelled on the same lines as 
previous colonial constitutions given to Malta under British rule”.7 The predominance of the 
                                                 
2 The process of Malta’s independence was relatively smooth. Following a request from Prime Minister George 
Borg Olivier in 1962 and a referendum in 1964, the Malta Independence Act 1964 was enacted by the UK 
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was passed by the Queen, accompanied by the agreed Independence Constitution. The Order decreed that from 
21 September 1964, Malta would be formally independent from the British, the new Constitution coming into 
force on that day. (See: sections 2 and 4, Malta Independence Order 1964). 
3 Other former colonies negotiating independence and receiving Constitutions from the British at this time 
include: Kenya, Malaya, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda. 
4 JJ Cremona, The Maltese Constitution and Constitutional History since 1813 (San Gwann: Publishers 
Enterprises Group (PEG) Ltd, 2nd ed., 1997), 69. 
5 See, for further discussion, Brian Blount, The Story of Malta (Mriehel: Allied Publications, 8th ed., 2017), 
chapters 9 and 10.  
6 The Treaty of Paris 1814, which marked the end of the Napoleonic wars, declared in article 7 “that Malta 
should belong in full sovereignty to His Britannic Majesty”. Occupation by the British was just the latest 
chapter in a long story: “Malta has been a colony of several great powers such as the Romans, the Arabs, the 
Normans, the Knights of St John, the French and, more recently, the British” (Kevin Aquilina, Constitutional 
Law in Malta (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer 2018), 23).  
7 Aquilina, The Rule of Law à la Maltaise (note 1), 113. Between 1813 and 1964, 11 Maltese Constitutions were 
ratified. 
  
Westminster model of government, for instance, explains many of the arrangements that 
prevail in both London and Valletta. The Head of Government in both cases is a member of 
the legislature who commands the support of a majority of the chamber, working with a 
Cabinet to effect executive leadership over the country. Even the positions of Head of State 
have their similarities. Though Malta is a Republic, the President is not elected by the 
people,8 having, as a result, a limited role in the legislative and executive processes and being 
“bound by the Constitution to act … on the advice of the Government of the day”.9 Also 
unelected (and, in fact, holder of a purely hereditary position), the British monarch has 
significantly limited power and responsibility, being required by convention to act on the 
advice of the Government of the day.10   
 One of the most notable distinctions between the Maltese and British systems, though, 
is the former’s reliance on a codified constitution. Along with all-but-three countries in the 
world,11 Malta’s Constitution is set out in a document, which makes provision for, inter alia, 
citizens’ rights, the powers and operation of the state’s governmental institutions, and the 
functioning of certain services and commissions. On this basis, the constitutional document 
reflects the highest source of law in Malta, all people and institutions being subordinate to its 
entrenched provisions and subject to the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court where they 
act contrary to its articles. This being so, the manner in which the supremacy of the Maltese 
Constitution is protected and upheld (both internally through its provisions, and externally 
through the operation of the Constitutional Court) is problematic. Entrenchment is weak, 
meaning that the Constitution is susceptible to easy change and manipulation by those 
holding political office, whilst the traditional role of constitutional review, including the 
power to declare laws void on grounds of constitutional invalidity, has not been fully 
assumed by the Constitutional Court. Consequently, it is argued that the Constitution of 
Malta cannot be regarded as supreme. Instead, the predominance of a codified document 
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9 Tonio Borg, A Commentary on the Constitution of Malta (Birkirkara, Malta: Kite Group 2016), 9. 
10 For further discussion on the Westminster Model, in the context of both Malta and the UK, see: William 
Elliot Bulmer, “Constrained majoritarianism: Westminster constitutionalism in Malta” (2014) 52(2) 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 232.  
11 Three countries in the world have uncodified constitutions: Israel, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.  
  
notwithstanding and despite over 50 years of independence from Britain, the Maltese system 
appears to cling to certain principles that derive from the UK’s own system, reliant as that is 
on the sovereignty of Parliament.12 Reforms are needed, therefore, to bring the instrument in 
line with normative understandings of a constitutional democracy, as well as broader 
constitutional principle. In so doing, this article is structured in two halves. The first discusses 
article 6 of the Constitution (the “Supremacy Clause”), considering the reasons underpinning 
the provision’s inclusion in the constitutional document, and analysing the process through 
which it – along with the rest of the Constitution – can be amended. The second half of the 
article then explores the Constitutional Court’s role in effecting constitutional review, 
critically evaluating the established practice of limiting a finding of invalidity to the 
particular case at hand, leaving it to Parliament to decide whether constitutionally invalid 
provisions should be repealed or should remain on the statute book.  
II. The supremacy clause and constitutional entrenchment 
Article 6 of the Constitution of Malta provides that: 
“Subject to the provisions of sub-articles (7) and (9) of article 47 and of article 66 of 
this Constitution, if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution, this 
Constitution shall prevail and the other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be 
void”.13 
On this section rests one of the most fundamental differences between the Maltese and UK 
systems: the constitutional document itself is supreme, Parliament is not. Indeed, 
emphasising this last point, article 65(1) of the Constitution makes clear that “[s]ubject to the 
provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of Malta”.14 These “provisions of this Constitution” include article 6 itself, 
thereby clarifying the legislature’s inferiority to the constitutional document. Emphasising 
this further, Attard also explains that “[u]nder Maltese law, it is the Constitution, and not 
Parliament, which is supreme … Parliament has to abide by the provisions of the 
                                                 
12 See: AV Dicey, edited by JWF Allison, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (first 
published 1885, Oxford: OUP 2013), 27. 
13 Constitution of Malta, article 6. 
14 Ibid., article 65(1). 
  
Constitution. Hence, Parliament’s supremacy is circumscribed by the provisions of the 
Constitution” itself.15  
 The importance of article 6 notwithstanding, though, the apparent ease with which 
certain provisions of the Constitution have been - and can be - amended by Parliament acting 
alone undermines the effectiveness of the supremacy clause and the sanctity of the 
constitutional document more generally, as this section will discuss. First, though, it is 
important to explain why it is that the drafters of the Maltese Constitution saw fit to include 
article 6 within the document, valid questions being raised concerning the need for express 
notice of constitutional supremacy. 
A. The need for the article 6 ‘supremacy clause’. 
In the American case of Marbury v Madison,16 the United States17 Supreme Court’s power of 
constitutional review was explained, including the Court’s ability “to void any law that … [it] 
deemed … to violate the Constitution”.18 In setting out the normative basis for this power, 
Chief Justice Marshall made clear that “it is a proposition too plain to be contested that the 
Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it”,19 thereby establishing a principle 
that has remained a firm tenet of US Constitutional Law: the Constitution is the highest form 
of law, and the Supreme Court has the power to review legislation where questions of their 
compliance with the Constitution are raised. Marshall identified this power of judicial review, 
not on the basis of any provision of the Constitution itself, but on the understanding that “[i]t 
would defeat the purposes of a written Constitution if the courts had to enforce 
unconstitutional statutes. The courts must exercise judicial review because the Constitution is 
                                                 
15 David Joseph Attard, The Maltese Legal System Volume II: Constitutional and Human Rights Law (Part A) 
(Msida: Malta University Press 2015), 15. Also see: Kevin Aquilina, “The Parliament of Malta versus the 
Constitution of Malta: Parliament’s Law-Making Function under Section 65(1) of the Constitution” (2012) 
38(2) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 217. 
16 5 US 137 (1803) 
17 Hereinafter US. 
18 Michael G Trachtman, The Supremes’ Greatest Hits: The 44 Supreme Court cases that most directly affect 
your life (New York: Sterling, 2nd ed, 2009), 24. 
19 5 US 137 (1803), 177. 
  
law, and it is the essence of the judicial function ‘to say what the law is’”.20 
 It is on the strength of the judgment in Marbury v Madison that the purpose of article 
6 of the Maltese Constitution can be questioned. If, as Chief Justice Marshall attests, the very 
foundation of a Constitution requires it to serve as the highest law in the land, this being “a 
proposition too plain to be contested”,21 then why is it necessary for that constitution to 
contain an express provision clarifying its own supremacy? Its predominance can be inferred 
from the circumstances surrounding the Constitution’s introduction, the procedure for its 
amendment and the nature of its provisions. Echoing this view, Cremona remarks “that it was 
unnecessary to include a provision in the Constitution to the effect that a law which was 
inconsistent with the Constitution was invalid, since the principle was implicit in the 
Constitution”.22 What is more, “as Professor Stanley de Smith puts it, ‘it does not strictly 
need to be expressly stated.’ It is connatural to our Constitution”.23 Though these views were 
also expressed at the 1963 Malta Independence Conference, at which the draft text of the 
Constitution was discussed, “one of the Opposition delegates [present] felt that there would 
be [an] advantage in making [the Constitution’s supremacy] clear, and what was later to 
become section 6 was … [consequently] introduced”.24 Cremona describes the article’s 
addition as ex abundanti cautela,25 reflecting that its inclusion was merely a matter of caution 
should future questions arise as to the predominance of the Constitution of Malta against the 
authority of the previously applicable sovereign UK Parliament. Indeed, and demonstrating 
this caution across other Commonwealth constitutions, Borg observes that, whilst “there are 
                                                 
20
 Richard H Fallon, The Dynamic Constitution: An Introduction to American Constitutional Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 13. The only mention that the US Constitution makes of supremacy is in 
article 6(2) which states: the Constitution “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”. 
Rather than serving as a statement of the document’s supremacy, however, its application also to “Laws of the 
United States … and … Treaties made … under the Authority of the United States” signify that the provision is 
intended merely as a clarification of individual states’ inferiority to the Constitution and federal laws.  
21 5 US 137 (1803), 177. 
22 Cited in: Borg, A Commentary on the Constitution of Malta (note 9), 32. Emphasis added. 
23 Cremona, The Maltese Constitution and Constitutional History since 1813 (note 4), 105, citing SA de Smith, 
The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd 1964), 109. 
24 Ibid., 105 – 6, citing Minutes of the Malta Independence Conference, 5th meeting, (19th July 1963). 
25 Ibid., 106. In English, this means “an abundance of caution”. 
  
at least fourteen Commonwealth countries whose Constitution does not contain a supremacy 
clause at all”, there are significantly more that do.26   
B. Amending the ‘supreme’ constitution 
The effectiveness of the supremacy clause, though, and the constitutional security it seeks to 
imply, can be questioned in the context of provisions outlining the process through which the 
Constitution can be amended. Article 66 of the Constitution of Malta sets out three possible 
ways in which amendment can be effected, each route applying to particular provisions. The 
first permits reform “supported by the votes of a majority of all the members of the House”;27 
that is, an absolute majority. The second way permits reform to certain specified provisions 
where “it is supported by the votes of … two-thirds of all the members of the House”.28 
Finally, the third way – applicable to just one provision29 – requires a two-thirds majority in 
the House and support of a majority of electors voting in a referendum.30 In short, then, all 
but one provision of the Constitution can be amended by a majority (either absolute or two-
thirds) in the House of Representatives. This represents a particularly weak form of 
constitutional entrenchment, which undermines not only the security of the constitution but 
also the effectiveness of the supremacy clause.  
The standard argument in favour of codified constitutional documents is their ability 
to offer a measure of protection to the important provisions set out in that Constitution. This 
is typically achieved through the explanation of an extraordinary process for constitutional 
amendment and repeal, making it harder to change or revoke, thereby affording the 
instrument a degree of entrenchment and rigidity. As Wheare explains, “a rigid Constitution 
is thought of as a Constitution which, because it contains legal obstacles, is hard to alter and 
is seldom altered”.31 This is desirable because it “make[s] an area of law more stable by 
                                                 
26 Borg, A Commentary on the Constitution of Malta (note 9), 32. 
27 Constitution of Malta, article 66(5). 
28 Ibid., article 66(2). 
29 This provision is article 76(2) of the Constitution, which concerns the duration of Parliament.  
Prior to reform in 1974, the mode of entrenchment requiring a two-thirds majority and a referendum for 
amendment applied to many of the more important constitutional provisions, such as the human rights chapter. 
Since 1974, however, article 76(2) is the only provision requiring this higher standard for amendment. 
30 Constitution of Malta, article 66(3). 
31 KC Wheare, Modern Constitutions (Oxford: OUP, 1966), 17. 
  
making it harder to change[, also] … indicat[ing] areas of law that the state regards as 
essential to its identity”.32 In the USA, for instance, whilst ordinary laws are passed by a 
simple majority in Congress, constitutional amendments not only require the support of two-
thirds of the House and the Senate, but in addition, ratification by three-quarters of all the 
states. In this way, we can say that the US Constitution enjoys a degree of entrenchment and 
rigidity, reflected by the reality that the Constitution has been amended on just 27 occasions 
in 230 years.  
Conversely, in Malta, despite the predominance of a codified document, the reality 
that most amendments to the Constitution can be passed either with an absolute majority or 
with the support of two-thirds of the House of Representatives is indicative of a weak form of 
constitutional entrenchment that leaves too much power with the unicameral legislature to 
effect fundamental change to the most important laws of the country. Indeed, this concern for 
weak entrenchment is exacerbated by the size of the House of Representatives in Malta. 
Typically, following a general election, 65 representatives are returned to Parliament, though 
there is provision for the return of 67 or even 69 members where the circumstances 
demand.33 Elections occur through the single transferable voting system, which, whilst a form 
of proportional representation, harbours the potential to deliver a strong government majority 
in the House,34 which could enable those in power more easily to pass constitutional 
amendments, particularly those just requiring an absolute majority. Indeed, depending on the 
size of the House of Representatives, the votes of only 44, 45 or 46 members is needed to 
achieve a two-thirds majority, the level of support required to amend many provisions of the 
Constitution. The weakness of the Constitution of Malta’s entrenchment, therefore, stems 
from the reality that Parliament can, in most cases acting alone, effect fundamental reform to 
                                                 
32 NW Barber, “Why entrench?” (2016) 14(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 325, 335. 
33 The relevant circumstances arise where the number of seats won by a party in an election is disproportionate 
to the number of votes cast in their favour. The disadvantaged party is given extra co-opted members to correct 
the difference and to bring the number of seats occupied in the House more in line with the number of votes 
won. (I am grateful to Dr Tonio Borg for guidance on this point. Also see: Borg, A Commentary on the 
Constitution of Malta (note 9), 10). 
34 At the 2013 General Election, for instance, the Labour Party won 39 seats in the House, against 30 Nationalist 
seats, reflecting the strongest government in recent years. This said, following the Constitutional Court’s 
judgment in Dr L Gonzi ne v Electoral Commission (CC) (25 November 2016), the “corrective electoral 
mechanism” (see ibid.) was applied and the Opposition was awarded two extra seats in the House, reducing the 
majority to 7. (I am grateful to Dr Tonio Borg for guidance on this point). 
  
the Constitution. The larger the government majority, the easier this is to effect. 
The impact of this weak entrenchment and the consequent ease with which Parliament 
can amend the constitution can be seen from reforms introduced by Acts No. LVII and LVIII 
of 1974. When the Constitution of Malta was first ratified, the article 6 supremacy clause 
could be altered by an absolute majority of the House of Representatives. With the necessary 
support, the House of Representatives passed Act No. LVII of 1974, which repealed – albeit 
temporarily – article 6 of the Constitution, thereby suspending its supremacy and permitting 
the passing of laws inconsistent with the Constitution. Indeed, section 2 of the Act replaced 
the repealed section with a provision that included the following: 
“Where an Act of Parliament provides that a law … shall have effect notwithstanding 
any provision of this Constitution, such law or provision thereof shall prevail and 
shall have full effect notwithstanding any provision of this Constitution and any 
inconsistency therewith, and this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, 
be without effect”.35 
In other words, where a law conflicted with the Constitution, it was the law, not the articles 
of the Constitution, which would take effect. With the supremacy clause suspended, Act No. 
LVIII of 1974 was then passed, bringing in various constitutional amendments, including that 
recognising Malta as a “democratic republic”.36 Having suspended the supremacy clause, 
though, and declaring that ordinary laws should to take precedence over conflicting 
provisions of the Constitution, the Maltese Parliament had paved the way for these reforms to 
take effect without needing to pay heed to the requirements for constitutional amendment, in 
these circumstances, a referendum.37  With Act No. LVIII’s amendments introduced, the 
supremacy clause was re-instated, section 69 of the Act providing that article 6 should read as 
initially passed.38 One further change made by the Act was that article 6 would, from that 
point on, require a two-thirds majority in Parliament before it could be amended or 
repealed.39 This last point notwithstanding, the circumstances surrounding amendment of the 
                                                 
35 Constitution of Malta, article 6(2), as amended by section 2, Act No. LVII of 1974. 
36 Ibid., article 1(1). 
37 See: Cremona, The Maltese Constitution and Constitutional History since 1813 (note 4), 106. 
38 See (note 13), above. 
39 Section 26, Act No. LVIII of 1974. See: Borg, A Commentary on the Constitution of Malta (note 9), 32. 
  
Constitution in 1974 shows how easily the Parliament could overcome the weak 
entrenchment of article 6, suspending the document’s supremacy and permitting fundamental 
reform through the ordinary legislative process. In this way, the supremacy clause was 
rendered ineffective, its suspension giving rise too easily to “a break in legal continuity”.40 In 
that moment Parliament was in effect supreme.41 Indeed, though upon the reinstatement of 
article 6, supremacy transferred back to the Constitution,42 it is still plausible now that “a 
power drunk government having a two-thirds majority in Parliament … [could still] amend 
section 6 so as to suspend the supremacy of the Constitution in order to prolong indefinitely 
the life-span of Parliament … without having to submit to the additional constitutional 
requirement of a referendum”.43 Consequently, since Parliament can determine both the 
supremacy and the content of the Constitution on its own, “there are situations where 
Parliament [can be seen as] … more supreme than the Constitution”;44 at the very least, the 
Constitution owes its own supremacy to Parliament, rather than the other way around.45 This 
reality has been widely criticised, most notably by Cremona, who explains that: 
“[I]t was both legally and logically meaningless and … essentially unsound that a 
whole elaborate entrenchment edifice, erected with … meticulous care by the 
Constitution itself as part of its basic structure to safeguard against abuse of power, 
should in fact have been viewed as capable of being so devastatingly dismantled by 
just a simple (and, to a prospective power-abuser, convenient) non obstante 
parliamentary clause”.46   
In practice, if not in form, these arrangements appear reminiscent of principles underpinning 
the UK Constitution, rooted as that is in the acceptance of Parliament’s supremacy over other 
institutions. The passing of the 1964 Independence Constitution in Malta and separation from 
the British Empire were intended to effect departure from the British tradition and in some 
                                                 
40 Cremona, The Maltese Constitution and Constitutional History since 1813 (note 4), 107. 
41 Ivan E Sammut, “The Constitution Prevails” Times of Malta (6 August 2012), 
<https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20120806/opinion/The-Constitution-prevails.431698> accessed 
13 December 2018. 
42 See ibid. 
43 Cremona, The Maltese Constitution and Constitutional History since 1813 (note 4), 107. 
44 Aquilina, The Rule of Law à la Maltaise (note 1), 160. 
45 See: Constitution of Malta, article 65(1), discussed at (note 14), above. 
46 Cremona, The Maltese Constitution and Constitutional History since 1813 (note 4), 107. 
  
respects this has been achieved. The practice of recognising the predominance of a supreme 
legislature, however, is reflective of the influence that the UK constitutional system, with its 
sovereign Parliament, still has over that prevailing in Malta. As former Chief Justice of 
Malta, Bonnici, notes:  
“Supremacy is a question of power. Where lies the ultimate power in our state? With 
us there is no doubt it is Parliament that has the power to do whatever it wills with a 
two-thirds majority of its members. Our Constitution was modelled on the lines of 
the British “Constitution” and there Parliament is supreme. And so it is with us; the 
only difference being that, in our case, that supremacy is watered down by the two-
thirds majority rule … Nevertheless, Parliament is supreme - not the Constitution”.47 
Any changes that could be introduced to bolster the supremacy clause and strengthen the 
Constitution of Malta’s mechanisms for entrenchment - discussed below - must, therefore, be 
mindful of the need to break more clearly from Malta’s colonial past and to establish a 
system that better serves the Maltese people by realising the objectives sought through the 
constitutional arrangements put in place in 1964.  
 The above notwithstanding, there are those who argue that the Constitution of Malta 
can still be regarded as supreme. Sammut, for instance, makes two points. The first holds that 
“the Constitution becomes the source of its own legality and today no one would question the 
legality of the Constitution in any court of law”.48 This argument, though, does not negate the 
view already set out and, in fact, appears to conflate the distinction between legal and 
political constitutionalism. The legal position has already been explained and is clear: 
through the provisions of the constitutional document, Parliament can determine both the 
supremacy and the content of the Constitution on its own, the only requirement being 
satisfaction of an absolute or two-thirds majority as necessary. Nowhere is there legal 
provision for the rule that “no one would question the legality of the Constitution”, this is 
merely a claim to political or conventional entrenchment, not any established legal rule. The 
second of Sammut’s points contends that “the Maltese courts [have] continued after 1974 to 
                                                 
47 Giuseppe Mifsud Bonnici, “The Supremacy of Parliaments” Times of Malta (2 June 2012), 
<https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20120602/opinion/The-supremacy-of-parliaments.422365> 
accessed 13 December 2018. 
48 Sammut, “The Constitution Prevails” (note 41). 
  
apply the judicial doctrine of constitutional supremacy and to consider Parliament bound by 
the Constitution”.49 This being so (albeit to a limited degree, as this article will go on to 
explain), this argument does not account for the fact that Parliament, with the necessary 
majority, can still easily and legitimately amend the constitution, and even suspend article 6 
as it did in 1974. The Constitution’s weak entrenchment is embedded within the document’s 
legal provisions, the political, conventional and judicial practices of the constitutional system 
leave this much unchanged. 
 As this section has shown, therefore, the Maltese Constitution’s supremacy clause has 
proved problematic, largely as a consequence of the weak entrenchment the constitutional 
document offers: the clause is insufficiently insulated. It is necessary to explore possible 
options for reform, therefore, that could bolster the supremacy of the Constitution and protect 
it in the future from easy amendment by Parliament.  
C. Strengthening the supremacy of the Constitution of Malta 
“[I]t would have been preferable … not to have had at all an explicit provision concerning the 
supremacy of the Constitution, which being implicit in the Constitution itself, was 
unnecessary”.50 Whilst the benefit of hindsight would seem to highlight the value of this 
view, regardless of the arguments - discussed above - both in favour of and in opposition to 
the existence of article 6, to explore any option for repeal of the supremacy clause would be 
to “shut the stable door after the horse has bolted”; a provision that has been made explicit 
cannot by its simple repeal be made implicit. If the House of Representatives were to 
legislate for the abolition of article 6, it would simply effect a shift of supremacy to the body 
empowered to strip the Constitution of this clause, that is, Parliament itself. There are other 
possible avenues for reform, though.  
 One option would be to secure a clearer and firmer basis for constitutional protection 
through recognising a blanket requirement for entrenchment; the same for all provisions of 
the Constitution. Though a two-thirds majority - perhaps even a three-quarters majority - for 
all amendments is preferable to a requirement for an absolute majority, it is still - on its own - 
unsatisfactory in a system that boasts a unicameral Parliament and a fusion of executive and 
legislative authority. The procedure for constitutional amendment must also involve a body 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
50 Cremona, The Maltese Constitution and Constitutional History since 1813 (note 4), 107. 
  
external to the politically elected legislature.  
 Ultimately, what is needed is two things. First, an additional layer in the constitution-
altering process. This could be satisfied by the creation of a permanent “Constitutional 
Committee”, a body made up of both appointed and elected members and much smaller than 
the House of Representatives.51 This Committee could be called into action whenever the 
House approves (by way of a two-thirds majority) a proposed constitutional amendment, the 
agreement of a majority of the Committee being required before that amendment can be 
ratified. This would serve to prevent a Government with a large parliamentary majority from 
pushing through constitutional amendments without any further check on their proposals. The 
second part of this proposed solution would be to accord the article 6 supremacy clause 
absolute permanence, protecting it from any form of amendment or threat of suspension. It 
would, in short, be unamendable. 
“An unamendable provision is ‘impervious to the constitutional amendment 
procedures enshrined within a constitutional text and immune to constitutional 
change even by the most compelling legislative and popular majorities’ … Such 
explicit unamendability, which is intended to express and protect deeply held values, 
has now become a standard constitutional design strategy”.52 
Such lengths of constitutional protection are seen, for instance, in France, the Constitution 
provides that “[t]he republican form of government shall not be the object of any 
amendment”.53 Also, in Germany, where “according to Article 79(3) of the German Basic 
Law, amendments affecting human dignity and the democratic and federal features of the 
constitutional order are inadmissible”.54 Placing the supremacy of the Constitution of Malta 
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beyond the scope of any potential amendment would ensure that no government could 
suspend article 6 and pass amendments through an ordinary, or even extraordinary, 
legislative process alone, as happened in 1974. It would, instead, make the supremacy clause 
unamendable, giving it the permanence and weight it demands, securing the predominance of 
the constitutional document over all institutions, including Parliament, thereby upholding and 
preserving the sanctity of the Constitution.  
 An alternative solution, though one that is perhaps not best suited to Malta’s 
constitutional arrangements, is to give - or at least permit - the Constitutional Court a role in 
the amendment process. Albert explains: “[i]n countries far and near … high courts have with 
accelerating frequency adopted the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment, 
authorizing themselves … to strike down an amendment for violating their reading of the 
constitution”.55 Where this practice has developed, it has generally done so not as the result 
of any express empowerment by the constitutional document, but rather by an extension of 
constitutional courts’ role in upholding their Constitutions.56 On this basis it is justified by a 
desire to “protect what [the courts] … regard as the fundamental values of constitutional 
democracy”.57 In this context, it is particularly attractive in a system - such as Malta - where 
the Constitution is weakly entrenched and can be amended by a strong majority in 
Parliament. In India, for example, the Constitution can be altered by an absolute majority of 
both Houses of Parliament and “by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of 
that House present and voting”.58 By satisfaction of the relevant parliamentary majority, then, 
a government has the power to effect fundamental change to the constitutional system. This is 
what happened in the 1970s under “the Indira Gandhi government, which relied on a supine 
Parliament to effect constitutional changes that the ‘hyper-executive’ government unilaterally 
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wanted”.59 As a consequence, the “basic structure doctrine” was developed by the Indian 
courts as a way of ensuring that the most fundamental features of the Constitution could not 
be amended, the courts asserting the power to declare reforms interfering with these 
fundamental features invalid. Through this rule, the courts could ensure that a powerful 
government acting alone could not effect fundamental constitutional reform on its own. “The 
Indian judges were convinced that if they did not intervene, all vestiges of democracy in 
India would eventually be removed”.60 
 In terms of the way in which this approach might work in Malta, the notion of the 
Constitutional Court asserting power to declare constitutional amendments unconstitutional 
can be justified in much the same way as the basic structure doctrine in India: in both 
countries, weak entrenchment means the Constitution is easily alterable by a strong 
government. Unlike India, though, one of the problems with this approach in Malta is doubt 
over the willingness of the Constitutional Court to assert itself in this manner. Development 
of this approach would require a high degree of judicial activism, the courts having to act 
“sometimes in defiance of the constitutional text”.61 As the next section of this article will 
demonstrate, the Maltese judiciary have not adopted a particularly activist approach to their 
constitutional responsibilities; indeed, and if anything, they have tended to do the opposite. A 
solution that centres upon a role for the Constitutional Court having the power to declare 
constitutional amendments unconstitutional, therefore, is perhaps not best suited to Malta’s 
constitutional arrangements.  
 This first half of the article, then, has discussed and explored the purpose and 
operation of the article 6 supremacy clause in the Maltese Constitution. Whilst the inclusion 
of the provision has been justified on legitimate grounds, the manner in which Parliament has 
been able to amend and manipulate the clause through the Constitution’s provision of weak 
entrenchment has presented a fundamental flaw in the Maltese system. Namely, it is often 
Parliament that can, in practice, make a claim to supreme authority, rather than the 
Constitution. This runs against not only certain provisions of the constitutional text itself, but 
it also undermines the sanctity and security of the constitutional settlement in Malta more 
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broadly. Another factor to consider, though, relates to the role of the Constitutional Court and 
its powers of judicial review, as the next section will now discuss.  
III. The role of the Constitutional Court in upholding the Constitution  
The Constitution of Malta, in addition to providing for its own supremacy, also empowers the 
courts of constitutional competence to entertain challenges to the validity of laws in light of 
the Constitution’s provisions. Article 46(1), for instance, provides that “any person who 
alleges that any of the provisions of articles 33 to 45 (inclusive) of this Constitution has been, 
is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him … may … apply to the Civil Court, 
First Hall, for redress”.62 Paragraph (2) of the article goes on to make clear that “[t]he Civil 
Court, First Hall, shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made 
by any person in pursuance of sub-article (1) … and may make such orders … and … 
directions as it may consider appropriate”.63 Article 95(2) then makes clear that “the 
Constitutional Court … shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine – … appeals from 
decisions of the Civil Court, First Hall, under article 46 of this Constitution; … [and] appeals 
… as to the interpretation of this Constitution … [and] as to the validity of laws”.64 Through 
these provisions, and similar to other codified constitutional systems across the world, the 
Constitutional Court, with the Civil Court, First Hall, works to uphold and protect the 
provisions of the Constitution, ensuring its supremacy over other laws and institutions. 
Indeed, the Constitutional Court itself has acknowledged that it is “the guardian of the 
Constitution”,65 and that it has the power “to determine the unconstitutionality of laws”.66  
 Consistent with these powers, there are many examples in Malta of “the courts of 
constitutional competence … [declaring] void laws enacted by Parliament either because they 
were inconsistent with the Constitution or with the ECHR as incorporated in the European 
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Convention Act”.67 It is what happens to an unconstitutional Maltese provision following a 
declaration of invalidity, however, with which this article is particularly concerned. In many 
other codified constitutional systems across the world, the power of a supreme or 
constitutional court to review the validity of laws against the provisions of the Constitution 
goes hand-in-hand with the power of that court to strike down as permanently void any laws 
that it has declared unconstitutional.68 In this way, the authority of that constitution, and its 
supremacy above other laws and institutions, is assured. Indeed, Tocqueville, in explaining 
the constitutional review power of the US Supreme Court, notes that “the power granted to 
American courts to pronounce on the constitutionality of laws remains … one of the most 
powerful barriers ever erected against the tyranny of political assemblies”.69 Despite the 
significance of this power of review, the practice in Malta is somewhat different from that in 
America and other codified systems. This is because: 
“Parliament has been allowed to arrogate to itself the final say as to whether those 
laws declared void by the Constitutional Court, should still remain valid and binding, 
or should be repealed … [whilst t]he Constitution gives no say to Parliament in the 
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process of determining the validity … of laws which have been challenged before the 
Constitutional Court … the Executive and the Legislature have in effect usurped 
it”.70  
That this is the case has recently been endorsed by the Constitutional Court itself. In January 
2018, “a declaration by the Constitutional Court of Malta that a law is unconstitutional has 
been interpreted to mean that this same law will remain in our statute book until and unless 
the people who originally passed that law, namely the legislators, decide themselves to 
remove it from the statute book”.71 This state of affairs is problematic for a number of 
reasons, as this article will go on to explore. First, though, it is necessary to consider why this 
practice has developed.  
A. The doctrine of judicial precedent and juridical interest 
The reasons underpinning the Constitutional Court’s practice of leaving it to Parliament to 
decide whether constitutionally invalid laws should be repealed are related and intertwined 
They concern what has been regarded as “[t]he baneful … transposing [of] civil law doctrines 
to constitutional rights”.72 The lack of a system of judicial precedent, on the one hand, means 
that even where the court takes a decision in a particular case to the effect that a law is 
unconstitutional, this is not binding on lower courts or in subsequent cases,73 whilst on the 
other hand, strict rules regarding juridical interest limits the scope of a particular case. This 
section considers these factors in turn.  
 Operating as they do within a civil law system, the Maltese Courts - including the 
Civil Court, First Hall and the Constitutional Court - are not bound by judgments handed 
down in previous cases and nor are they required - where relevant - to follow the judgments 
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of superior courts.74 Instead, the findings in a given case and on a particular point of law are 
binding merely between the relevant parties – res inter alios acta – and not binding to all 
through creation of any judicial principle – erga omnes. Consequently, this means that where 
a particular judgment is handed down to the effect that a given law is contrary to the 
Constitution, that finding is only binding on the parties to that case and does not create a 
precedential finding for constitutional invalidity. As Aquilina explains: 
“[T]he Constitutional Court, in recognizing that a provision of a law runs counter to 
the constitution when challenged by a particular person, fails to extrapolate that 
finding to others who end up in the same fate as that person. Because Malta does not 
subscribe to the doctrine of precedent, the Constitutional Court could declare a 
provision of ordinary law to be in breach of the constitution in one lawsuit and then 
come to the opposite conclusion regarding the same provision in another lawsuit”.75 
Only where Parliament acts to repeal the offending law will the Constitutional Court - and 
other courts - thereafter consider its provisions to be no longer applicable.76 There is a wealth 
of case law, which not only demonstrates this practice but which also emphasises the extent 
to which it underpins the Constitutional Court’s tendency to regard constitutionally invalid 
provisions as valid in the event that Parliament has not repealed the relevant law. As Bonello 
explains, for instance: 
“On September 6, 2010, [in the case of Joseph Muscat v Prime Minister77] the 
Constitutional Court found a law establishing compulsory arbitration in some traffic 
accidents to be valid, as it was in conformity with the human rights provisions of the 
Constitution. On September 30, 2011, [in the case of H Vassallo and Sons Ltd v 
Attorney General78] the Constitutional Court in a lawsuit instituted by a different 
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plaintiff, ruled that the same law on compulsory arbitration was void as it violated the 
same human rights provisions of that same Constitution. According to current 
thinking, there is nothing to preclude the Constitutional Court from deciding at some 
future time, that the law which it had found to be valid in 2010 and void in 2011, to 
be valid in 2012 and to be void in 2013”.79 
Bonello’s last comments were somewhat prophetic, the Constitutional Court finding in 
Untours Insurance Agency Limited v Victor Micallef et80 that the same provisions were 
constitutionally valid.  
 It is not always a case, though, of the Court finding constitutional provisions valid 
where previously they have been declared invalid, sometimes the same decision is reached in 
respect of an invalid provision, the key factor being that the Court has considered the issue in 
isolation each time, regardless of previous findings. In Anthony Frendo v Attorney General, 
for example, the Court had declared schedule 6(4)(c) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 to be 
in breach of article 39(2) of the Constitution and article 6(1) of the ECHR. Upon hearing a 
later case – Vincent Cilia v Prime Minister et81 – that presented a challenge to the same 
provisions on the same grounds, however, the Court held that it was not bound by the earlier 
decision because it did not bind erga omnes. The Court went on to make clear, though, that 
“its decision did not negate the ability of the Constitutional Court or the Civil Court, First 
Hall … to declare a particular provision of the law in conflict with the rights of a citizen in 
one case and then to make the same declaration regarding another person in a similar case”.82 
These cases show, though, that by not adhering to any system of judicial precedent, 
conflicting findings of constitutional (in)validity by the Constitutional Court are not only 
possible but are deemed legitimate and appropriate. Explaining why this is the case, the 
Constitutional Court in the case of H Vassallo and Sons Ltd v. Attorney General83 explained 
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that: 
“The present day action and that of Joseph Muscat v Prime Minister decided by this 
Court on 6th September 2010 were not an actio popularis on the validity of laws 
under article 116, and therefore applicants had to provide juridical interest. As a 
result of this … the remedy which it grants is necessarily limited to the interest which 
forms the basis of the action. The interest of applicant in such cases is to seek remedy 
in his case and not that the law be declared invalid ergo omnes; for the plaintiff has 
no interest in the case of others. Therefore the most that a court can state is that the 
law is without effect in the particular case before it and not in other cases. In other 
words, in a case which is not one under article 116 of the Constitution, where 
therefore the applicant has to prove personal interest, a declaration that a law is 
inconsistent with the Constitution (or by analogy with the Convention) has effect 
only inter partes”.84 
As this extract shows, the absence of a system of judicial precedent, therefore, and the effect 
this has on findings of constitutional invalidity, is influenced by the rules on juridical interest. 
In Malta, “to initiate proceedings and open a case before a court of law, plaintiff or applicant 
must provide juridical interest which is personal in the subject matter of the litigation. He 
cannot start proceedings in order to obtain an opinion or for mere personal satisfaction. There 
must be a tangible benefit to him in consequence of a breached legal right”.85 On this basis, 
judgments in such cases apply only to the specific parties to the case and do not establish any 
broader principle applicable in wider cases. The effect of this particular factor is evident from 
the case of Paola sive Pawlina Vassallo v Marija Dalli.86 Here, the court was requested to 
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declare that, since articles 12(4) and (5) of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance, Chapter 158 
of the Laws of Malta, had been declared contrary to the constitution by the Constitutional 
Court in the prior case of Mario Galea Testaferrata et v Prime Minister et,87 these provisions 
were – since that case was decided – “not operative at law and could no longer be applied”.88 
The Civil Court, First Hall, however, held that the Constitutional Court’s declaration in the 
Mario Galea case, was res inter alios acta,89 not erga omnes. As such, that those articles were 
invalid in the earlier case, did not automatically mean that they should be regarded as invalid 
in all cases thereafter. Indeed, and what is more, the Civil Court, First Hall, also noted that 
“articles 12(4) and (5) of Chapter 158 still remained operative in the statute book … 
[because] the Maltese parliament had not taken any action to have the articles amended or 
revoked”.90  
 The lack of any system of judicial precedent, therefore, along with the strict rules on 
juridical interest, contributes to the Maltese courts’ practice of leaving it to Parliament to 
decide whether constitutionally invalid provisions should be repealed. Though both these 
principles (or lack thereof) are central to Malta’s judicial tradition, their relevance in a 
constitutional setting is inappropriate. They are principles of civil law, supported by section 
237 of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure,91 and should not be applicable in the 
much broader sphere of public law. 
“[I]n civil lawsuits, a civil-law judgement only applies to the parties in that civil law 
suit. But in constitutional litigation, private-law principles are totally immaterial – we 
are … in the entirely different realm of public law, in a public-law confrontation to 
establish the objective truth whether a law conforms to the Constitution or whether it 
defies it. In a constitutional lawsuit there are no private civil-law relationships or 
contractual interests at stake – there is the state which is claiming … that the 
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impugned will of the legislative power is in conformity with the Constitution, and 
there is the Constitutional Court solemnly telling the state that it is or that it is not”.92 
Adherence to the Maltese judicial tradition notwithstanding, though, the reality that 
legislative provisions found to be unconstitutional can - and are - still regarded as valid by the 
courts is constitutionally problematic, as the next section will now explain.  
B. The Constitution and its normative function 
Above all, this approach calls into question the supremacy and sanctity of the Maltese 
Constitution and runs contrary to its normative function. The supremacy clause and provision 
for the Constitutional Court to find unconstitutional laws invalid has already been explained, 
above. In reality, though, if and where the Constitutional Court identifies a law inconsistent 
with the Constitution, rather than any automatic declaration to the effect that the law be 
regarded as permanently and universally void, the Court leaves it up to Parliament to act (or 
not) in respect of the unconstitutional provision(s). Where Parliament does not Act, the courts 
still regard that law as valid in future cases. The consequent effect of this is to undermine the 
Constitutional Court’s role under article 95 and to condition the supremacy clause in article 6 
with the proviso that where a law is found to be “inconsistent with [the] Constitution”, it is up 
to Parliament to decide whether or not that “law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be 
void”.93 In other words, “[t]he Constitutional Court has …  waived aside the supremacy of 
the Constitution”,94 and impliedly declared Parliament as the de facto source of supreme 
authority. In so doing, the Court has presented another feature of the Maltese constitutional 
system that is reminiscent of the UK’s own constitutional arrangements, with its emphasis on 
parliamentary sovereignty, and thus the UK’s historic colonial influence on the islands. 
Indeed, it is a key facet of parliamentary sovereignty that “no person or body [including a 
court of law] is recognised … as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament”,95 it being central to the judicial function that the will of Parliament is always 
respected. Contrary to articles 65 and 95 of the Constitution of Malta, Maltese judges appear 
to conduct their responsibilities in a way that is not inconsistent with this rule. Their apparent 
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deference to Parliament on whether laws that have been found to be unconstitutional should 
be regarded as thereafter valid reflects a judicial desire to respect the will of a Parliament that 
is arguably supreme over its own Constitution.  
 Beyond running contrary to substantive provisions of the Constitution, though, this 
approach is also counter to the normative function of the Constitution, which is in part 
realised through articles 6 and 95, but also bolstered by well-established principles of 
Constitutional Law. To explain, Thomas Paine famously wrote in the years following the 
ratification of the US Constitution that:  
“A constitution is a thing antecedent to a government, and a government is only the 
creature of a constitution. The constitution of a country is not the act of its 
government, but of the people constituting a government … the government is … 
governed by the constitution”.96 
In a similar fashion, Chief Justice Marshall’s assertion in Marbury v Madison, that “[t]he 
powers of the Legislature are defined and limited … [by] the Constitution”, justifies his later 
claim that “the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the Legislature”,97 thereby 
explaining the Constitution’s supremacy over the institutions it creates.98 Inherent within any 
Constitution, therefore, is - or should be - a normative acceptance of supremacy over a state’s 
institutions, a reality that is typically reflected in the constitutional document’s provision for 
the formation, powers and limitations of the institutions of government. If a Constitution 
creates these institutions and clarifies the scope of their powers, it would be unlawful for 
those institutions to act beyond those powers and unconstitutional for them to act in such a 
way that assumes supremacy over the Constitution that gave them those powers. In this vein, 
it has already been explained that article 65(1) of the Constitution of Malta provides that 
“[s]ubject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the peace, 
order and good government of Malta”.99 This clearly ensures that Parliament’s law-making 
power is subordinate to the Constitution, but that within the authority provided by the 
Constitution, Parliament may make any law: “Parliament is supreme within and subject to the 
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Constitution itself”;100 the Constitution of Malta gives Parliament its power.  
 In reality, though, by arrogating “to itself the final say as to whether … laws declared 
void by the Constitutional Court, should … remain valid and binding”,101 Parliament – 
encouraged by the courts - is actually going beyond the scope of its powers set out in the 
Constitution and assuming a constitutional supremacy over and above the Constitution itself. 
The effect this approach has on the Constitution of Malta is that as soon as we start to 
compromise on the sanctity or supremacy of the constitution - as has been the case through 
Parliament’s assumption of the final say on the constitutional validity of laws - we 
immediately relieve that Constitution of its authority as the highest source of law and relegate 
it to the status of ordinary law. The Constitution of Malta cannot ultimately be deemed 
supreme if, when informed of a law contravening that Constitution, the Parliament has 
discretion as to whether that law should be retained or repealed. Such discretion represents 
the prerogative of supreme power and relegates the Constitution to a body of ordinary law. 
Substantiating this reality, Chief Justice Marshall said in Marbury v Madison that: 
“The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary 
means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable 
when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part of the alternative be true, 
then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, 
then written Constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the people to limit a 
power in its own nature illimitable”.102 
Though the Constitution of Malta enjoys a slightly different procedure of amendment to 
ordinary law, technically making it “unchangeable by ordinary means”, the weak 
entrenchment coupled with the reality that the Constitutional Court defers to Parliament on 
matters of constitutional invalidity nonetheless demonstrates the extent to which the 
document is “alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it”.103 The approach to 
constitutional review in Malta, therefore, undermines the sanctity and supremacy of the 
Constitution, runs counter to its normative function and relegates the document to the status 
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of ordinary law.  
 The extent to which this approach runs contrary to accepted understanding of a 
constitution can be seen from a parallel drawn with the UK system and, in particular, the 
Human Rights Act 1998. This Act seeks to maintain a balance between ensuring that 
legislation is interpreted compatibly with the European Convention on Human Rights104 on 
the one hand, and unavoidable incompatibilities dealt with appropriately, consistent with 
prevailing constitutional norms on the other. To this end, section 3(1) of the Act provides that 
“[s]o far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation … must be read and given effect in a 
way which is compatible with the Convention rights”.105 Where a compatible reading is not 
possible, section 4 of the Act empowers the court to “make a declaration of … 
incompatibility”.106 These declarations do “not affect the validity, continuing operation or 
enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given; and … [they are not] binding on 
the parties to the proceedings in which it is made”.107 This means that where a court has 
found a provision to be incompatible with the ECHR, they have the power only to declare 
that provision incompatible. Such a declaration merely notifies Parliament and Government 
of the incompatibility, leaving it up to them to decide if and how best to deal with the 
offending law. This approach reflects the reality that, in the absence of a codified 
constitutional document, supreme domestic authority rests with Parliament, which can pass 
any law whatsoever, that law binding all parties and institutions, including the courts who 
have no power to declare Acts void. Sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 are 
consistent with these arrangements, the courts stopping short of striking out legislation 
incompatible with the ECHR, and leaving it with Parliament and Government to resolve any 
incompatibilities if and when it chooses.  
Despite the obvious parallel between this mechanism and the practice of the Maltese 
Constitutional Court leaving it to Parliament to rectify (or not) unconstitutional laws, there is 
a crucial difference. Putting this in the context of the current discussion, we can say that the 
UK courts’ approach – under the 1998 Act – in simply declaring a law incompatible and 
deferring to Parliament is entirely consistent with prevailing constitutional arrangements, the 
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mechanism designed to uphold the sovereignty of Parliament as the prevailing norm in the 
UK. By contrast, in Malta, the Constitutional Court’s deference to Parliament, on whether 
provisions found to be unconstitutional should be repealed, runs against prevailing 
constitutional norms and undermines the Constitution as the accepted locus of ultimate power 
by permitting Parliament, rather than the Constitutional Court, the final say on matters of 
invalidity. This article goes on later to explore ways in which this approach might be 
corrected; for now, there is a broader constitutional principle relevant to this discussion: the 
separation of powers. 
C. The Constitutional Court and the separation of powers 
The principle of the separation of powers is widely understood,108 Montesquieu’s explanation 
providing a firm base on which it is argued that the three core constitutional functions - 
legislature, executive and judiciary – should be exercised independently from one another 
and with minimal overlap so as to protect citizens from potentially arbitrary exercises of 
power.109 Despite the familiarity of the principle, it is accepted that “Montesquieu never 
advocated a complete separation of powers”.110 Indeed, Borg – writing in respect of the 
Maltese Constitution – notes that complete separation would “in practice … be 
impossible”.111 This appears to be an accepted view: Founding Father, James Madison, in 
contributing to the Federalist Papers also acknowledged that Montesquieu “did not mean that 
these departments [legislative, executive and judicial] ought to have no partial agency in, or 
no control over, the acts of each other”.112 Indeed, it is widely accepted that a degree of 
overlap between the institutions is necessary to ensure that “each branch of government – 
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legislature, executive, and judiciary – is able to check the exercise of power by the others, 
either by participating in the functions conferred on them, or by subsequently reviewing the 
exercise of that power”.113  
 Such a conception of the separation of powers is known as “checks and balances” and 
is prominent in constitutions across the world. It is this principle, though, that justifies states 
with codified constitutions having a supreme or constitutional court charged with upholding 
its provisions by “checking” that what other institutions do is constitutional. The relevance of 
the US Supreme Court in this regard has already been noted, the aforementioned case of 
Marbury v Madison providing the appropriate authority.114 Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall 
said in that case: 
“It is … the … duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is … if a law be in 
opposition to the Constitution … [and] both the law and the Constitution apply to a 
particular case … the Court must either decide that case conformably to the law, 
disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the 
law … If … the Courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior 
to any ordinary act of the Legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, 
must govern the case to which they both apply. Those, then, who controvert the 
principle that the Constitution is to be considered in court as a paramount law are 
reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the 
Constitution, and see only the law. This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of 
all written Constitutions”.115 
In short, therefore, on the basis that constitutions are, by their very nature, superior to 
ordinary laws, it is incumbent upon courts, where relevant, to assess the validity of ordinary 
laws against the provisions of the constitution, thereby acting as a “check” on ordinary law. 
That Marbury v Madison sets out the basis for this valuable constitutional principle (in the 
USA, at least) is explained by Trachtman:  
“[A]fter Marbury v Madison … a single citizen … can invoke the power of the 
judiciary to measure their laws and decisions against constitutional standards. Each 
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citizen, through this right to invoke the overriding authority of the Constitution, can 
play a direct role in controlling government … [Consequently] constitutional 
democracies throughout the world … revere the decision as the wellspring of the 
checks and balances that make a true and lasting democracy feasible”.116 
The application of the checks and balances conception of the separation of powers doctrine in 
states with codified constitutions, therefore, typically sees a supreme or constitutional court 
fulfilling a valuable constitutional role in checking the validity of laws against the provisions 
of the Constitution. In Malta, though, by failing to regard findings of invalidity as 
permanently binding, instead leaving it to Parliament to determine whether or not an invalid 
law should be repealed, the Constitutional Court is falling short of its responsibilities by 
failing to provide an adequate check against breaches of its provisions. Bonello criticises this 
in strong terms: 
“[The] Constitutional Courts … have betrayed their very foremost function: that of 
ensuring that nothing inconsistent with the Constitution would have the force of law 
in Malta. They have abdicated, with daring insouciance, the very reason of their 
existence: that of squashing the head of any law that violates the Constitution … A 
law found by the Constitutional Court to wound the very core of the Constitution is 
still a valid law. Anti-constitutional, but perfectly legitimate. It is only the political 
Parliament, they ruled, that has the power to annul it”.117 
In this way, therefore, the separation of powers principle in Malta is inadequately protected. 
It is central to the work of constitutional courts that actions of institutions inferior to the 
constitution be checked and scrutinised, so as to preserve the sanctity of the constitutional 
document. In Malta, though, by stopping short of recognising constitutionally invalid 
provisions as permanently void, the Constitutional Court is eschewing its responsibilities 
under the separation of powers principle by failing to offer an effective check on allegedly 
unconstitutional Acts and decisions.  
 As the last few sections have discussed, therefore, the practice of the Maltese 
Constitutional Court in permitting the “Parliament … to arrogate to itself the final say as to 
                                                 
116 Trachtman, “The Supremes’ Greatest Hits” (note 18), 25 – 26.  
117 Giovanni Bonello, “Foreword” to Borg, A Commentary on the Constitution of Malta (note 9), xxii. 
  
whether … laws declared void by the Constitutional Court, should still remain valid and 
binding”,118 presents a number of constitutional problems. It is contrary to the provisions and 
normative function of the Constitution itself, as well as to broader constitutional principle. In 
terms of seeking a solution, though, the next section sets out recommendations for 
establishing a firmer basis for constitutional review in Malta. 
D. Re-establishing constitutional review 
This article has already explained that the Constitution of Malta provides a basis on 
which actions can be brought contesting the constitutional validity of legislation. The 
document is silent, however, as to the effect judgments in such cases have going forward. It is 
here where a possible solution to some of the issues discussed above could be sought. In 
short, what is needed is a firmer and more defined procedure for constitutional review. To 
this end, fresh provisions could empower the Constitutional Court not only to declare 
unconstitutional laws invalid, but also to hold that a finding has universal and permanent 
effect.  
There is precedent for such provision. The French Constitution, for instance, requires 
that Acts, before their entry into force, be referred to the Constitutional Council for a ruling 
“on their conformity with the Constitution”,119 whilst article 61-1 adds that: “[i]f during 
proceedings in progress before a court of law, it is claimed that a statutory provision infringes 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the matter may be referred … to the 
Constitutional Council”.120 These provisions are buttressed by article 62, which states:  
“A provision declared unconstitutional on the basis of article 61 shall be neither 
promulgated nor implemented. A provision declared unconstitutional on the basis of 
article 61-1 shall be repealed as of the publication of the said decision of the 
Constitutional Council or as of a subsequent date determined by said decision. The 
Constitutional Council shall determine the conditions and the limits according to 
which the effects produced by the provision shall be liable to challenge. No appeal 
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shall lie from the decisions of the Constitutional Council. They shall be binding on 
public authorities and on all administrative authorities and all courts”.121 
In other words, the French Constitution expressly ensures that legislation declared invalid by 
the Constitutional Council be immediately void. This occurs either through Acts not yet in 
force not being implemented or through repeal of existing legislation. It is argued that a 
similar provision could be added to the Maltese Constitution, thereby ensuring that Acts 
declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court be regarded as universally and 
permanently void. A proposal on similar, though not identical, lines has been suggested 
before by Attard, who comments: 
“Given the importance of the issue, and the Constitutional Court’s position, it would 
appear prudent for Parliament to promulgate legislation which would settle the matter 
in favour of the view that once a law is declared inconsistent with the Constitution, 
then it would ipso facto be void and null erga omnes”.122 
The problem with this particular proposal is that Parliament, controlled by a large 
government majority, could easily repeal such legislation, thereby restricting the 
Constitutional Court’s ability to strike down unconstitutional laws. If, as the first part of this 
article suggested, the Constitution becomes more entrenched, then setting such a proposal out 
in the Constitution itself would protect the process of constitutional review from easy change 
and manipulation. Indeed, and as with the proposed unamendability of article 6, above, a 
similar absolute protection could be afforded to any provision setting out constitutional 
review in the manner described in this section.   
 In terms of the precise scope of this proposed power, it would be for those setting the 
finer details of such a provision to determine whether a finding of invalidity would effect an 
immediate and automatic repeal, as in France, or whether it would require Parliament to act 
either to rectify the unconstitutional features of the Act or to repeal it entirely. Indeed, with 
the latter proposal in mind, the Today Public Policy Institute’s review of the Constitution 
suggested that “[o]nce the Constitutional Court pronounces its judgment, a Constitutional 
mechanism should exist to oblige Parliament to correct the law in question forthwith”.123 This 
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potentially raises questions of judicial precedent. This article has already explained how the 
civil law system in Malta does not operate within a system of judicial precedent, decisions of 
the courts being binding only inter partes and not erga omnes. An exception could be made, 
however, with regards to findings of constitutional invalidity reached by the Constitutional 
Court under this proposed provision, this being justified on the grounds of constitutional 
prudence and the need to uphold and protect the sanctity of the constitutional document.  
 Through making provision for a firmer basis for constitutional review in this way, 
therefore, the Constitutional Court of Malta could assume a role that is more in keeping with 
that of such an institution, protecting more robustly the Constitution from the clutches of 
Parliament. 
IV. Concluding remarks 
The Constitution of Malta, then, though a relatively recent development, has become firmly 
established as the primary source of authority in Malta, albeit one that is unquestionably 
rooted in its imperial past. Despite its provision, however, prominent features of the 
constitutional document present issues as regards the extent to which we might view the 
Constitution as the ultimate source of supreme power. Its express provision for its own 
supremacy, for instance, coupled with its general provision for weak entrenchment, mean that 
the Constitution can too easily be amended by the House of Representatives. More 
fundamentally, though, the Constitutional Court’s findings of constitutional invalidity have 
been taken only to bind the parties to the particular action at issue and not to reflect any 
broader or permanent declaration of unconstitutionality. This is, in part, a result of the civil 
law system that prevails in Malta, operating as that does without any practice of judicial 
precedent and with strict rules on juridical interest, but also a tendency of the court to see the 
power permanently to strike down legislation as resting solely with Parliament. The 
combined effect of these issues is to reveal a Constitution that cannot easily be regarded as 
supreme, that supremacy in practice seeming to rest, at least to a degree, with Parliament. 
This is problematic not only insofar as it undermines the normative function of the 
Constitution, but also because it means the Constitutional Court falls short of its 
responsibilities within the doctrine of the separation of powers. Moreover, it appears 
reminiscent of the UK’s own constitutional arrangements - from which Malta sought to 
separate in the 1960s - in recognising the supremacy of Parliament, rather than the supremacy 
of the Constitution, even where prevailing constitutional provisions and norms would seem to 
  
support the latter over the former. With these issues in mind, though, this article has offered 
proposals for reform that would see the Constitution enjoying a firmer basis for supremacy, 
complete with stronger entrenchment, and a constitutionally protected requirement that 
findings of invalidity by the Constitutional Court have the effect of rendering void the 
offending Act (or sections thereof). Only then, it is argued, could the Maltese constitutional 
system claim a document that is truly supreme over other laws and institutions. 
 
 
 
 
